Vote, But Verify: Electronic machines need a paper trail

12:00 AM CDT on Monday, July 5, 2004

There's just one thing wrong with electronic voting machines: People don't trust them to accurately record their votes. Voters reasonably fear fraud – a padding of the totals or a manipulation of the software so that a vote for Smith automatically becomes a vote for Jones.

So it's equally reasonable that voters would want to verify their votes through the use of paper receipts that they could check and that could be used in recounts.

The League of Women Voters pumped some big momentum into the "verifiable paper trail" movement late last month when it rescinded its support for paperless systems. Delegates at the league's convention voted to support systems that are as "recountable" as they are secure, accurate and accessible.

Good for the league.

It's true that paper receipts have their own potential flaws and complications. Printers jam. Receipts could be as mutilated and as difficult to decipher as the infamous Florida punch cards. And machines that have been programmed to record incorrect votes could be programmed to print out correct receipts.

Nevertheless, receipts would provide a decent safeguard in case someone hacks machines to change an election's outcome. No one's apparently tried to manipulate the machines yet. But computer experts have demonstrated that it could happen.

Furthermore, machines in some states have malfunctioned, causing voters to be effectively disenfranchised. Receipts would have provided a recountable record.

The solution – in Texas and elsewhere – verify with paper.