Diebold in the News — A Partial List of Documented Failures

"A common practice for local election officials is to let election companies run their election — make up their ballot, set up their machines, and even count their tallies. This is a dangerous practice." ~ Ted Selker, Cal Tech/MIT Voting Technology Project. ¹

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<td>1998</td>
<td>AccuVote OS</td>
<td><strong>Pima County, Arizona.</strong> For the third time in as many elections, Pima County, Arizona, found errors in the tally. The computers recorded no votes for 24 precincts in the 1998 general election, but voter rolls showed thousands had voted at those polling places. Pima was using Global Election Systems machines, which now are sold under the Diebold company name. ²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| November 2000 | AccuVote Optical Scan | **Bernalillo County, New Mexico.** Election officials in the state’s most populous county found that a flaw in the ballot programming caused 67,000 absentee and early-voting ballots to be incorrectly counted following the Nov. 7 presidential election.³

  The tabulation system and software worked correctly, but a county technical employee failed to set up an element of the system properly, said Frank Kaplan, Global’s Western regional manager. New Mexico’s ballots are designed for voting by party, but voters can choose candidates from other parties. A programmer did not link the candidates’ names to their respective parties.

  “The problem took 22 minutes for us to fix,” he said. “It was just a matter of clicking on the correct link.” |


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<td>November 2000</td>
<td>AccuVote OS</td>
<td><strong>Volusia County, Florida.</strong> Internal Diebold memos (leaked in 2003) show that the company officials knew about the 16,022 Gore votes that were subtracted, and they still don't have an explanation for why the votes were lost. Tampering may have been the cause.</td>
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<td>The memos show that more than a year ago, Diebold knew of a problem with the Florida 2000 election - where a memory card inexplicably subtracted 16,022 votes from a total previously recorded for Vice President Al Gore.</td>
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<td>Tampering was one of four possible causes Diebold couldn't rule out at the time, the memos show. A year later, Diebold's latest official position on Florida's Volusia County vote count still does not rule out tampering. Company spokesman Bear said recently only that he was not familiar with the aberrant vote count in Volusia County.</td>
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<td>&quot;The problem precinct had two memory cards uploaded,&quot; wrote Diebold tech Tab Iredale in one of the memos among Diebold employees. &quot;There is always the possibility that 'the second memory card' came from an unauthorized source.&quot;</td>
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<td>Allen said, &quot;The e-mails confirmed what we suspected - Diebold upper management knew of the problem.&quot; 4</td>
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<td>April 2002</td>
<td>AccuVote TS</td>
<td><strong>Johnson County, Kansas.</strong> An unexplained software error caused the voting computers to miscount the votes.</td>
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<td>In the April 2002 municipal elections, some modems used to transmit results from polling places to the central election office failed. The county no longer transmits results from polling places to the central election office via modem; cartridges that record results are hand-delivered to the office.</td>
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<td>Also, results were misreported in six races. The system miscounted hundreds of votes, and a re-count was ordered.</td>
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<td>... Diebold investigated the problem and said in a news release issued at the time that a software error had led to the election night problem. 5</td>
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| August 2002  | Central count         | **Clay County, Kansas.** The machine showed that the challenger (Jennings) had won, but a hand recount showed that the incumbent commissioner (Mayo) won by a landslide — 540 votes to 175. In one ward, which Mayo carried 242-78, the computer had mistakenly reversed the totals.  
This statement suggests that the computer in the "one ward" had the candidates mis-mapped to the table that holds the voting results. |
| November 2002| AccuVote TS           | **Maryland.** When voters voted for the Republican candidate for governor, an ‘X’ appeared beside the name of the Democratic candidate.  
“I pushed a Republican ticket for governor and his name disappeared,” said Kevin West of Upper Marlboro. “Then the Democrat’s name got an ‘X’ put in it.”  
Other voters saw a banner announcing "Democrat" at the top of their screen regardless of their choice. |
| November 2002| AccuVote OS           | **Robeson County, North Carolina.** Ballot tabulating machines failed to work properly in 31 of 41 precincts. Local election officials said the problem was the result of a software glitch, and ballots had to be recounted. In a January 2004 interview with Dinah in the office of the Robeson County Director of Elections, she said that there had been a problem in the programming of the memory cards and all the ballots had been recounted by hand. |

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http://www.ljworld.com/section/election02/story/103526

7 Glitches cited at some polls. The Washington Times, 6 November 2002; Referenced in Black Box Voting, by Bev Harris. Chapter 2.

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| October 2003 | GEMS – Election Management Systems | **Alameda County, California.** Tally software suddenly began to malfunction during processing and began giving one candidate's votes to a different candidate in the recall election.  
Poll workers in Alameda County noticed something strange on election night in October. As a computer counted absentee ballots in the recall race, workers were stunned to see a big surge in support for a fringe candidate named John Burton.  
Concerned that their new $12.7 million Diebold electronic voting system had developed a glitch, election officials turned to a company representative who happened to be on hand.  
Lucky he was there. For an unknown reason, the computerized tally program had begun to award votes for Lt. Gov. Cruz Bustamante to Burton, a socialist from Southern California.  
...Alameda County officials still don't know why the computer program failed on election night. In fact, they only discovered the malfunction because they could compare the paper absentee ballots the software was counting to the computer's tally.9 |
| October 2003 | AccuVote OS and TS | **California.** In a notable aberration in the 2003 California recall-election vote totals in the 17 California counties that used Diebold, several minor candidates recorded widely disproportionate vote totals.  
In Tulare County, major candidates Arnold Schwarzenegger, Cruz Bustamante and Tom McClintock each received 1.1 percent or less of their vote totals. But Randall Sprague got 38 percent of his state total in Tulare. Ronald Palmieri got 29 percent of his total in Tulare county. Jerry Kunzman got 35 percent of his total in Tulare County.  
For all Diebold-machine counties taken together, disparities for those three were even wider - a full 91 percent of Kunzman's statewide votes came in just the 17 Diebold counties out of the 56 counties around the state.  
Some researchers, including New York University Professor of Media Studies David Crispin Miller, wondered about a conspiracy, theorizing Diebold machines could have shifted votes cast for Bustamante to Kunzman, Palmieri and Sprague in order to favor Schwarzenegger.10 |

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10 [Tulare] County votes for machines. By Roger Phelps, The Porterville Recorder; June 10, 2004  
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<td>October 2003</td>
<td>GEMS</td>
<td><strong>Alameda County, California.</strong> A bug in the election management system caused tally errors when the election results from multiple machines were merged. &lt;br&gt; ... the cause is a problem with the GEMS 1.18.18 program.¹¹  &lt;br&gt; The only solution is to use a new version of the software, version 1.18.19, if and when it is certified.</td>
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<td>December 2003</td>
<td>AccuVote OS and TS</td>
<td><strong>California.</strong> Secretary of State discovers that Diebold installed uncertified software throughout California before the recall election, without informing county officials. &lt;br&gt; &quot;An audit of Diebold Election Systems voting machines in California has revealed that the company installed uncertified software in all 17 counties that use its electronic voting equipment. ... Diebold admitted wrongdoing Tuesday at a meeting of the state's Voting Systems Panel.&quot;¹²</td>
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<td>December 2003</td>
<td>Diebold</td>
<td><strong>Seattle, Washington.</strong> Investigative journalist Bev Harris announced her discovery that a Diebold programmer had been convicted of stealing money by tampering with computer records. &lt;br&gt; At least five convicted felons secured management positions at a manufacturer of electronic voting machines, according to critics demanding more stringent background checks for people responsible for voting machine software. &lt;br&gt; Voter advocate Bev Harris alleged Tuesday that managers of a subsidiary of Diebold, one of the country's largest voting equipment vendors, included a cocaine trafficker, a man who conducted fraudulent stock transactions and a programmer jailed for falsifying computer records. &lt;br&gt; The programmer, Jeffrey Dean, wrote and maintained proprietary code used to count hundreds of thousands of votes as senior vice president of Global Election Systems, or GES. Diebold purchased GES in January 2002. &lt;br&gt; According to a public court document released before GES hired him, Dean served time in a Washington state correctional facility for stealing money and tampering with computer files in a scheme that &quot;involved a high degree of sophistication and planning.&quot;¹³</td>
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<td>March 2004</td>
<td>GEMS</td>
<td>Maryland. In its report to assure Alameda County, Diebold announced that in the</td>
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<td>Maryland primary, they had used a version of GEMS that had not yet received federal</td>
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<td>qualification.</td>
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<td>As a point of information, the State of Maryland successfully utilized GEMS 1.18.19</td>
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<td>in their March Primary Election in their 22-county roll-out of touchscreens.</td>
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<td>The GEMS version is expected to be federally qualified in May 2004.</td>
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<td>March 2004</td>
<td>AccuVote TS</td>
<td>Alameda County, California. A bug in the firmware, caught during pre-election testing,</td>
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<td>prevented votes from being cast when certain race combinations were selected using the write-in functionality. The County must use a workaround.</td>
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<td>To address this anomaly, the County opted to reprogram the elections database so that all races, including the crossover races, were treated as regular races.</td>
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<td>This subsequently required the County to manually calculate results for the two races where crossover combined results were required. 14</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 2004</td>
<td>AccuVote OS</td>
<td>Alameda County, California. A bug in the software caused the machines to count absentee ballots inaccurately. The County must use a workaround.</td>
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<td>The problem resided with the (unique) internal precinct ID numbers exceeding the largest number that is possible to print on the optical scan ballot.</td>
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<td>... The high number of the database imports inadvertently caused the precinct ID number to exceed the largest number that it is possible to print correctly on the optical scan ballot.</td>
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<td>... For future elections, should a required change be found late in the database proofing process, DESI [Diebold] recommends the County not re-import their election set up file into the same database and instead build a new database. 16</td>
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Compiled by www.votersunite.org
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| March 2004 | AccuVote TS | **San Diego County, California.** Ten votes were inexplicably lost at one polling place.  
John Pilch, a retired insurance agent who worked as a polling place inspector in San Carlos, said that when polls closed at 8 p.m. Tuesday, the number of people who signed the voter log differed from the number of ballots counted by computers.  
"We lost 10 votes, and the Diebold technician who was there had no explanation," said Pilch, who registered complaints with elections officials, his county supervisor and several others. "She kept looking at the tapes." 17 |
| March 2004 | AccuVote TS | **San Diego County, California.** Multiple problems occurred,18 among them:  
Poll workers saw unfamiliar Windows screens, frozen screens, strange error messages and login boxes none of which they'd been trained to expect.  
A report released Monday by Diebold Election Systems shows that 186 of 763 devices known as voter-card encoders failed on election day because of hardware or software problems or both, with only a minority of problems attributable to poll worker training.  
Diebold’s post-mortem of the March 2 election said it was "disappointed" in the encoder failures and that it values its ties to local elections officials. But the McKinney, Texas-based firm offered no fundamental explanation of how and why the company delivered faulty voting equipment to Alameda and San Diego counties its two largest West Coast customers on the eve of the 2004 presidential primary. |

17 **Poll workers, voters cite tied-up hotline, poor training, confusion.** Union Tribune; March 7, 2004; By Jeff McDonald and Luis Monteagudo Jr.  
18 **Diebold reports multiple problems: Registrar wants reason for e-voting.** Tri-Valley Herald; April 13, 2004; By Ian Hoffman, Staff Writer.  
http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=2390
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| March 2004   | AccuVote OS | **San Diego County, California.** Out of 208,446 ballots, the machines miscounted 2,821 votes in the Democratic presidential race and the Republican U.S. Senate seat.  
   Most of the absentee miscounts occurred in the Democratic presidential race, in which 2,747 votes cast for John Kerry were incorrectly credited to Rep. Dick Gephardt. In the Senate race, in which Bill Jones won, 68 votes cast for Barry L. Hatch were credited to candidate Tim Stoen, and six votes cast for James Stewart were credited to Stoen.  
   The miscounts occurred because multiple scanners simultaneously fed the absentee ballot data into the computer tabulation system. The large number of ballots and candidates on them overwhelmed the system. ...  
   "These performance failures are unacceptable," [County Chief Administrative Officer Walt] Ekard wrote [to Diebold]. "Having a reliable and trouble-free voting system is absolutely essential to the county. Your failure to provide such a system in the March election was extremely troubling and any issues that remain must be fully resolved long before the November election." |
| April, 2004  | AccuVote OS | **Uxbridge, Massachusetts.** The machine failed to read 171 ballots because they were completed with the wrong kind of lead. Recount of the selectman race overturned the election. Because other candidates did not file for a recount in time, the other races cannot legally be recounted. Thus the other races remain in question.  
   The final decision was reached seven weeks after the election, after two hand recounts. |

19 *New electronic scanners miscounted some county votes*. NC Times April 7, 2004; By: Gig Conaughton - Staff Writer;  


21 *Town slated to hold second recount*. Milford Daily News; Wednesday, June 2, 2004; By Sara Withee, News Staff Writer  
http://www.milforddailynews.com/localRegional/view.bg?articleid=49152
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| April 2004 | Diebold | California. Secretary of State Kevin Shelley called on the Attorney General to bring criminal charges against voting-machine-maker Diebold Election Systems for fraud.  

The reasons are explained in the staff report of the California Voting Systems and Procedures Panel.

Here are some excerpts:

Prior to and during the hearing [of November 10, 2003], Diebold representatives either claimed to have obtained federal qualification for the TSx system or that federal approval was imminent.

...Diebold subsequently failed to obtain federal qualification for the entire TSx system or even to pursue federal qualification of the firmware (software that is used to operate the precinct voting machines).

Indeed, Diebold not only failed to obtain federal qualification for the TSx system, but failed even to pursue federal qualification of the firmware versions the VSPP authorized Diebold to install in the wake of the discovery that uncertified software had been installed.

... Less than a month before the March Primary, after repeated assurances to the contrary, this office learned that Diebold was no longer pursuing federal ITA approval of the software and firmware installed on California voting machines. Rather, Diebold had instructed the ITA to test a newer version of both software and firmware. It also became clear that the federal ITA could not approve the newer software and firmware before the March Primary.

Shortly before the March Primary, Diebold finally obtained from the federal ITAs a very limited approval to use the TSx system installed on California voting machines, with certain "patches," on a one-time basis. Shortly before the election, Diebold engaged in a crash project to install the patches on its California voting machines. [Footnote: "In a letter dated April 14, 2004, Diebold now admits that, in its haste, it failed to install these patches on at least 34 voting machines, requiring partial recounts."]

... In sum, Diebold:

1. marketed and sold the TSx system before it was fully functional, and before it was federally qualified;
2. misrepresented the status of the TSx system in federal testing in order to obtain state certification;
3. failed to obtain federal qualification of the TSx system despite assurances that it would;

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22 [California Bans E-Vote Machines](http://www.wired.com/news/evote/0,2645,63298,00.html)

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| April 2004 | AccuVote TS and TSx              | California. Secretary of State Kevin Shelley decertified all electronic touch-screen voting machines in the state due to security concerns, primarily caused by Diebold.  
Shelley said the ban on touch-screen machines would stay in effect unless and until specific security measures could be put in place to safeguard the November vote.  
...Additionally, Shelley declared that no county or vendor would be able to make last-minute changes to voting systems. Such changes caused problems in at least two counties in the March primary where a malfunctioning Diebold device prevented hundreds of polling places from opening on time.²⁴ |
| May 2004  | AccuVote OS                      | Marblehead, Massachusetts. Machine count showed 1834 to 1836. Manual recount showed 1831 to 1830, overturning the election outcome.²⁵  
[Town Clerk Thomas] McNulty said new precinct totals would be available today. He said he was warned by the company that made the voting machines that, "When it's that close anything can happen."  
(Final decision reached three weeks after the election, after a hand recount.)                                                                                                                                       |

²⁵ Recount overturns result of Marblehead selectmen election. The Daily Item; Wednesday, June 2, 2004; By Jack Butterworth.  
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| July 2004  | Company | **Clayton County, Georgia.** In violation of Georgia state law, Diebold delayed absentee voting by failing to deliver ballots to the county within the required time. The laws says:  

The superintendent shall, as soon as practicable prior to each primary or election, but at **least 45 days** prior to any primary or general election other than a municipal primary or election, ... prepare, obtain, and deliver an adequate supply of official absentee ballots to the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk for use in the primary or election.  

Because of redistricting, the time was shortened to 30 days, but still Diebold was late sending the ballots. On July 2, absentee voting still had not begun for the July 20 election. Diebold was supposed to deliver them on June 25; on July 1, they sent out a "partial shipment" with a promise to send the rest on July 5.  

Clayton County Board of Elections and Registration Member Bob Bolia said the ballots were supposed to be delivered June 25, then Monday and now this coming Monday.  

Other counties also experienced delays in receiving absentee ballots, but 18 days before the election, Clayton County still had not received any.  

Those who don't get their votes in "would have recourse with the county," said Cara Hodgson, a public information officer with the Georgia Secretary of State's office.  

... **The delay will primarily affect overseas voters**, Hodgson said. Clayton County is home to Fort Gillem, and Fort McPherson is only a few miles away, and the county has many soldiers overseas.  

Diebold spokesman, David Bear, didn't know the cause of the delay, nor the day the ballots were supposed to ship, yet he said:  

"I don't think it's a matter of anyone's fault."  

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| July, 2004 | AccuVote TS | **DeKalb and Chatham Counties, Georgia.** In what Georgia Secretary of State Cathy Cox called "a very ordinary primary election day," voting problems ranged from incorrect summary pages ... 28  
Ziyadah Sabir said she's concerned the touch-screen machine didn't properly record her vote. The summary page, which allows voters to review their choices before casting their ballots, failed to show some of her choices and showed incorrect choices for others, Sabir said. Poll workers could not fix the problem, she said.  
"That's not very reassuring," said Sabir of DeKalb County, who was voting for the first time on the machines.  
... to incorrect ballots ... 29  
Voting problems seemed widespread enough in Tuesday's primary election to prompt the two candidates in the District 1 Chatham County Commission race to pledge a challenge if the vote were close.  
Colin McRae said he asked for the Democratic ballot because he wanted to be sure to vote in the 12th Congressional District race. He double-checked with the poll worker, asking if the computer card really activated the Democratic slate.  
When the poll worker said it did, he put the card in the machine. But it only showed the nonpartisan judicial candidates.  
The poll workers called a technician and held up the line until the problem was solved - 45 minutes later.  
... to lost ballots.  
Craig Kidd of Buckhead said he voted last week as part of the state's advance voting program, which allows people to cast ballots during a five-day period before an election.  
Kidd said on Tuesday he went to his precinct to make sure his vote had been recorded. Poll workers said they had no record of his vote and advised him to cast another ballot, Kidd said.  
"I find that a little distressing," said Kidd. "I like the concept of advance voting, but if this is a common thing, you could have hundreds or thousands of people who think they voted but they actually haven't." |
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<td>July, 2004</td>
<td>AccuVote TS</td>
<td><strong>DeKalb County, Georgia.</strong> Over 150 Georgia citizens volunteered as poll watchers in the primary. They observed machine malfunctions and irregularities. Excerpts from one observer's report.30</td>
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When the polls opened ...

- We had a poll watcher in every precinct, informed and trained with the things to look for and how to address the problems the moment they cropped up. We insured the law was followed to the letter.

- The calls from the poll watchers began promptly at 7:00 AM with every irregularity, improper behavior and machine malfunction they saw reported to the attorneys.

- One precinct reported almost upon opening of the polls that all machines (10) were failing. **Voters inserted the access card and the card was immediately ejected.** The pollwatcher reported that voters were offered provisional paper ballots, but they were prepared with only 25 of these ballots and ran out within 10 minutes. It took almost 2 hours to rectify the situation even though our HQ personnel reported it to the County office immediately.

When the machines overheated at the polls ...

- At 4:15 we received a call from one of the precincts. The poll manager had announced to the pollworkers that all the DREs were malfunctioning because the polling place was unairconditioned and unventilated.

- We arrived at the polling place and asked to speak to the Poll Manager who explained that they were experiencing some problems but they had a technician on the way. Our Pollwatcher had asked the technician to note the problems on his forms. He signed his name, wrote in the time (1:00 PM) and noted "All machines running hot."

- We spoke with the technician and he explained that the machines were behaving erratically. Because of the heat, when a voter placed their hand on the touchscreen, their chosen candidate would change (the red X would jump all over the screen) and voters would have great difficulty casting their vote for the candidate of their choosing. He informed us the problem began occurring at 12:15 and was getting progressively worse as the environment in the polling place was heating up with the daytime heating.

- Voting continued on the overheated machines until the polls closed at 7:00 PM.

Talking to the Elections Director ...

- One of the questions we asked involved the 13 overheating machines and she repeated the "human failure" response saying it was the humans who overheated and overreacted. She went on to explain that the Diebold DREs were "certified to operate to 200 degrees" and the humans weren't.

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<td>Craig Kidd cast a ballot ahead of the July 20 Republican primary during the five-day period for advance voting. A designated Republican poll watcher and campaign worker for a GOP state Senate candidate, Kidd showed up at his Buckhead polling place on Election Day to make sure his advance vote had been recorded. Kidd claims a poll worker told him there was no record of his vote and advised him to vote again to be sure his vote would be tallied.</td>
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<td>Later in the day, Kidd contacted The Atlanta Journal-Constitution to tell a reporter he was alarmed that he was allowed to cast two ballots. Kidd said he was concerned that the ballots of some early voters would not be counted or that some people could vote twice.</td>
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<td>Fulton election officials have acknowledged that a breakdown in procedures allowed Kidd to vote twice. When a voter casts an early ballot, a notation of that vote should be made on a master voter registration list that is later sent to precincts prior to Election Day. Poll workers then will cross the advance voters off the list of people eligible to vote at their polling place.</td>
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<td>Fulton officials later disqualified Kidd’s early vote, which has a unique identifying number allowing election officials to know who cast it.</td>
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<td>In the next few days, Secretary of State Cathy Cox will release numbers showing that on July 20 voters requested more Democratic ballots (731,111) than Republican ones (671,961). The numbers are based on ballot counts slowly being assembled from the 159 counties.</td>
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<td>On the Democratic side of the U.S. Senate race, 625,115 votes were cast. That means nearly 106,000 Democrats — 14 percent of the total — took a look at the eight-candidate field. And passed.</td>
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31 Constitution of Georgia. Article II. Section I. Paragraph I. http://www.cviog.uga.edu/Projects/gainfo/conart2.htm


Percentages are based on total ballots reported in the above article and total votes reported on the Georgia elections results site for Democrats (http://www.sos.state.ga.us/elections/election_results/2004_0720/0000110.htm) and Republicans (http://www.sos.state.ga.us/elections/election_results/2004_0720/0000120.htm)
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<tr>
<td>July, 2004</td>
<td>AccuVote OS</td>
<td>Putnam County, Georgia. The optical scanner failed to read nine ballots.</td>
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<td>AccuVote TS</td>
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<td>For Tuesday's election, the absentee and early voter ballots were counted through the optical scan system the county has used for its past elections. This also delayed vote counting because there were nine ballots that the optical reading machine could not read.</td>
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<td>These had to be read and certified by an official ballot divining board made up of one Republican, one Democrat and one non-partisan.</td>
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<td>Several precincts had trouble getting the touch-screen votes accumulated onto one machine. In one precinct, the accumulation problem was never resolved.</td>
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<td>&quot;There were a couple of precincts that had problems with what they call 'accumulating,'&quot; Howard said [Pat Howard, Putnam County probate judge and election superintendent]. &quot;But all of them worked through it, but one.&quot;</td>
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<td>Howard said each machine is closed out by a poll worker at the end of voting, then a paper readout of the number of votes is printed. These numbers are checked against the number of voters who used the machine.</td>
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<td>Then, she said the PC cards, which look like a large version of a memory card from a Sony PlayStation, are taken out of each machine and inserted into one machine. All the votes are then accumulated in that one machine and transferred to the courthouse to be accumulated with the votes from other precincts.</td>
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<td>At precinct 4C, there was a problem with this process and eventually all the PC cards had to taken to the courthouse and accumulated there. This delayed the tallying on non-absentee votes until 10 p.m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug, 2004</td>
<td>Diebold printery</td>
<td>Clayton County, Georgia. A month after delaying absentee voting in the July primary, Diebold delays the August run-off election by failing to deliver the printed ballots in time.</td>
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<td>Clayton County officials are still waiting for the ballots to come from the printers, but hope to open early voting today for the Aug. 10 primary run-off.</td>
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Diebold in the News — A Partial List of Documented Failures

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| September 2004 | Company | California. Attorney General Bill Lockyer dropped the state's criminal investigation of Diebold and joined with Alameda County and two voting integrity activists, Bev Harris and Jim March, suing the company in a False Claims Act. 36

Their False Claims Act suit, filed under seal and in the name of state and local taxpayers, alleged that Diebold sold a nearly $13 million touch-screen system to Alameda County by misrepresenting its accuracy, security and government approval. As state and county attorneys weighed the case, state and local elections officials found that Diebold had installed unapproved software in Alameda County's touch-screens, that its system was vulnerable to hacking and that its central vote-tabulating program gave thousands of absentee votes to the wrong candidates.

"We received assurances when they sold a voting system to us, and those assurances have not been met," said Alameda County Counsel Richard Winnie.

Secretary of State Kevin Shelley blasted Diebold for what he called a "culture of deceit" and referred the company to the state attorney general for criminal investigation.

Lowell Finley, an Oakland-based elections lawyer who filed the original suit on behalf of Harris and March, said his clients will watch to ensure the state and county to pursue the case with vigor.

"Now that the state's attorney general has waded into this controversial issue, it is going to be important for him and the people of the state that he delivers something substantial, either in terms of a verdict or a very favorable settlement for California taxpayers," Finley said. "I don't think he would have made the decision to intervene if he didn't think that was possible."

| September 2004 | Accuvote TS | Rockville, Maryland. The sensitive touch screen registered U.S. Senator Mikulski's vote incorrectly during a demonstration at a local festival. 37

Mikulski got a firsthand look at possible voting mistakes when she tried out an AccuVote TS touch screen machine Sunday at a folk festival in Takoma Park. But as Mikulski voted on a mock referendum question, her hand inadvertently grazed the screen and cast a "yes" vote for another mock question, according to Morrill, who stood next to her as she tested the machine.

Mikulski, who had planned to vote "no" on the question, tried to push the "no" button to change her vote, but the machine didn't make the change. She eventually was able to correct the ballot.

[Mikulski's aide Michael Morrill] said ... the example reinforces her belief that a voter moving quickly through a ballot could inadvertently cast the wrong vote.

http://www.trivalleyherald.com/Stories/0,1413,86~10671~2387400,00.html


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## Diebold in the News — A Partial List of Documented Failures

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| September 2004 | Accuvote TS | **Rockville, Maryland.** The Montgomery County election board allowed Stan Boyd, a local election judge, to use a Diebold Accuvote TS for demo purposes at a Rockville festival. But after the machine registered Senator Barbara Mikulski's vote inaccurately, Mr. Boyd decided to keep the machine long enough to have an expert test the machine to diagnose the problem. County officials have filed a court order to force Mr. Boyd to return the machine. 38  

Boyd, a 63-year-old retired high school teacher from White Oak, said he wasn't trying to hold the machine hostage. He said his purpose was to search out any problems with the voting system that Maryland residents will use in the upcoming election.  

"The whole purpose is to find out what things can be fixed -- and before the elections -- so they are trustworthy," he said after the hearing. ... 

After news reports Monday of Mikulski's problem, Boyd said county elections officials contacted him and he agreed to return the machine that day. But after CBS asked him if it could test the machine, he told the county he planned to keep the machine until Thursday, as originally planned. 

**County officials said they then contacted Boyd at least nine times by phone in an effort to get him to return the machine; Boyd said they even showed up at his house.**

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| September 2004 | Accuvote OS | **King County, Washington.** Although the optical scan software revisions intended to handle a new style of ballot were not qualified by an ITA, the state assigned provisional certification to the software after completing what the Secretary of State's office claimed was "extensive" testing. For example, in a letter to VotersUnite!, State Director of Elections Nick Handy defended the state testing process by stating that it included:  

    Functional tests of each system to ensure that the variety of ways that a voter might mark a primary consolidated ballot will be counted in accordance with the new Washington State law.  

However, the functional tests didn't catch a major software design error that caused the machines to reject valid ballots. Ballots without a party choice selected were rejected by the precinct-optical scanners, even if the voter intended not to vote in partisan races.  

    Among the disgruntled in King County was attorney Rhys Sterling, who learned the ballot box wouldn't accept his ballot because he voted only on nonpartisan races and issues.  

    After the machine returned his ballot, a poll supervisor at Hobart Community Church asked whether he had chosen a political party (he had not) and whether he had deliberately not chosen a party. His ballot was accepted only after the supervisor opened the machine and pressed a button overriding its programming.  

    "So much for secret ballots," said Sterling, who claims that yesterday's voting procedures violate the state constitution's guarantee of "absolute secrecy" in preparing and depositing ballots.  

The problems could easily have been avoided if the revised software had been adequately designed. It simply had to accept nonpartisan ballots and reject ballots with votes in party races but no party choice marked.  

   http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2002036002_primary15m.html
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<td>September 2004</td>
<td>AccuVote TS and modems</td>
<td><strong>Prince George County, Maryland.</strong> The modem at the central facility malfunctioned, and voters in one precinct weren't able to vote the Democratic ticket on the paperless machines, so they wrote their choices on pieces of paper. 40</td>
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<td>The Board of Elections had technical difficulties last night compiling results. Election workers said the main modem to receive results from the polls had malfunctioned.</td>
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<td>Election officials said there were no major problems at polls throughout the day.</td>
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<td>The only known glitch was at Mount Rainier Elementary School. When polls opened yesterday, nearly a dozen voters were told the machines were not pulling up the Democratic slate.</td>
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<td>Linda Couch, a Mount Rainier resident, said poll workers told the voters that because the machines weren't operating properly, they could write down their choice on a piece of paper. Couch said some voters left, saying they would try to come back. Others, like her, wrote their selections down on the paper.</td>
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<tr>
<td>November 2004</td>
<td>Central Count Optical Scanner</td>
<td><strong>Crittenden County, Arkansas.</strong> More than 11% of the ballots failed to register a vote for president.41</td>
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<td>1,853 of the county's 17,284 voters had selected more than one presidential candidate. Another 131 ballots were counted as having no checkmarks for president.</td>
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<td>About one in every eight ballots cast in Crittenden County failed to register a choice for president.</td>
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<td>Unusual ballot design elements and ballot programming errors may have contributed to the problems, but Secretary of State Charlie Daniels refused to allow a manual recount of the ballots.</td>
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<td>Regardless of the cause of overvotes in Crittenden County, there was no justification for conducting a recount, according to Tim Humphries, staff counsel to Arkansas Secretary of State Charlie Daniels.</td>
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<td>&quot;There is no authority under the Arkansas Code for a recount after the election has been certified,&quot; Humphries said. &quot;The law says if there is to be a recount, it must happen before then.&quot;</td>
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| November 2004| AccuVote TS     | **Maryland.** On election day, TrueVoteMD registered 383 reports involving 531 incidents of problems encountered by voters. Many voters reported votes switching on the screens.\(^{42}\) These problems ranged in severity from moderate inconvenience to outright voter disenfranchisement. The significance of these complaints increases dramatically, however, when one considers that Maryland had a total of 1,787 precincts this year, and TrueVoteMD was only able to cover a fraction of these—some 6%. ... Most incidents that were reported to TrueVoteMD fell into the following categories:  
♦ Lost votes due to incomplete ballots that were missing candidates or entire races  
♦ Lost votes due to machines crashing or freezing before the voter cast a ballot  
♦ Lost votes due to “smart card” and encoder failures  
♦ Lost votes due to delayed poll openings because of machine boot-up failures  
♦ Lost votes due to voter abandonment because of unacceptably long waits  
♦ Lost votes resulting from touch screen failures that included vote switching, review screen malfunctions, unintended selections and submission of ballots before voters had made selections, hypersensitivity to touch that caused voters to complain that “it was out of control and I have no idea who my votes were cast for,” screens going blank  
♦ Lost votes from unreadable voting machine hard drives (PCMCIA cards)  
♦ Lack of privacy because machines were oriented so that the screens were visible by those waiting on line to vote  
♦ Discrepancies between electronic vote tallies and manual vote tallies  
♦ No offer of provisional ballot or wrongful denial of provisional ballot  
♦ Disenfranchised voters due to failures in the Motor Vehicle Administration registration process.  
♦ Inadequate staffing and insufficient training of election judges |

## Diebold in the News — A Partial List of Documented Failures

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<td>March 2005</td>
<td>AccuVote Touch screen</td>
<td>Montgomery County, Maryland. The IT report to the County Elections Board reveals widespread problems with the electronic voting machines on election day. Here are some excerpts:43</td>
</tr>
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#### Information Technology – Election Day Review

#### Election Day Equipment Review

For Election Day, 2,597 voting units were deployed. An additional 80 voting units were sent to about 65 polling places on Election Day to replace malfunctioning units. A few were sent out to accommodate long lines at polling places.

From Help Desk tickets and GEMS reports, 189 voting units (7%) of units deployed failed on Election Day. An additional 122 voting units (or 5%) were suspect based on number of votes captured.

**Of the 189 voting units that failed:**

1. On Election morning, 58 voting units failed to boot up, showing a Ballot Exception Error. These units were unusable and were immediately taken out of service. No votes were captured on these units.

2. 106 voting units experienced screen freezes. In staff opinion this is the most serious of errors. Election judges and technical staff reported that many of these units froze when the voter pressed the Cast Ballot button. This leads to great confusion for judges and voters. The voter leaves the polling place with little or no confidence that their vote was counted. In many cases, the election judges are unable to provide substantial confirmation that the vote was, in fact, counted.

3. 25 voting units failed due to a variety of problems including card readers, printers, and power problems.

4. The additional 122 suspect voting units were identified because few votes were captured compared to other units in the same polling place. A unit was considered suspect if it had 25-50 votes captured when all other units in the polling place had over 150 votes.

5. Of the 1,245 encoders deployed, approximately 30 failed and were replaced on Election Day. Preliminary tests indicate that the failures are a result of little or no battery power.

6. Prior election day, we prepared approximately 95 voting units using new touch screen units and new PC memory cards. Of these, 5 failed; 4 with screen freezes and 1 with a ballot exception error. Another 4 units were in the suspect category.

As of February 16, 2005, Diebold in Maryland was unable to diagnose the problems and was shipping the systems out of state for testing.44

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| July 2005  | AccuVote TSx with vvpat printer              | **California.** After testing 96 touch screen machines and finding a 10% error rate, Secretary of State Bruce McPherson rejected Diebold’s application to certify the AccuVote TSx touch screen with AccuView printer module.45  
  After possibly the most extensive testing ever on a voting system, California has rejected Diebold’s flagship electronic voting machine because of printer jams and screen freezes, sending local elections officials scrambling for other means of voting.  
  "There was a failure rate of about 10 percent, and that's not good enough for the voters of California and not good enough for me," Secretary of State Bruce McPherson said.  
  If the machines had been used in an election, the result could have been frustration for poll workers and long lines for thousands of voters, elections officials and voter advocates said Thursday.  
  "We certainly can't take any kind of risk like that with this kind of device on California voters," McPherson said.  
  Kim Alexander, president of the Davis-based California Voter Foundation, said McPherson deserves credit for ordering rigorous testing.  
  For years, voters have reported frozen screens and other glitches in the polling place.  
  "It's always been the voters' word against election officials' and the vendors'," Alexander said. "Now we have real proof right before the eyes of state elections officials." |

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 Archive at: http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=5774
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| September 2005 | AccuVote TS   | **Cobb County, Georgia.** New “upgraded” software caused technical problems during the modem transmission of vote data.  
New computer software and problems transmitting precinct results to the central Cobb Board of Elections offices in Marietta delayed results from Tuesday's Special Purpose Local Option Sales Tax referendum, election officials said.  
... At precincts with the worst problems, poll workers had to drive to the central elections office and hand deliver the results, Ms. Dunn [director of the Cobb Board of Elections and Registration] said.  
Then, the final tally showed that **285 ballot were completely blank**, and the margin of victory was only 117 votes.  
About 285 voters showed up at the polls on Sept. 20 for Cobb's Special Purpose Local Option Sales Tax referendum but never cast a vote.  
The number of these "nonvotes," where a registered voter received a ballot but left without voting either yes or no, was more than twice SPLOST's 114-vote victory.  
While election officials and political observers say the nonvoters likely would not have swayed the election in the other direction, some say they indicate continued problem's with Georgia's electronic voting system.  
The reasons put forth by officials boggle the mind. For example:  
Dr. Carol Pierannunzi, director of the A.L. Burruss Institute of Public Service at Kennesaw State University, said there are a number of reasons voters show up to the polls but never cast a vote.  
"There are people who are in the habit of voting," she said. "Civic duty and whatever else compels them to go to the polls, but they don't know enough about the matter to vote."  
And the official response is equally disturbing:  
Cobb election officials described the number of nonvotes in the SPLOST referendum - less than 300 out of almost 40,000 ballots cast - as "irrelevant." |

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| March 2006 | AccuVote Optical Scan    | Grafton, New Hampshire                                  | Two vote tabulators were seized by the state’s Attorney General after malfunctioning during elections held on March 14.  
No matter how you do the math, 193 “yeas” plus 198 “nays” don’t add up to 369 votes.  
That faulty equation — results of a warrant article vote from Tuesday’s election ballot — was the first clue for Grafton town officials that something was wrong.  
... The margin of error could end up changing the outcome of two important warrant articles, [Town Clerk Mary] McDow said — one for a new police cruiser and the other for a compactor for the town’s recycling center.  
Officials speculate that a dip switch on the machine was set incorrectly.  
However, [Grafton Selectman Jennie] Joyce said she is in favor of recounting ballots, both by hand and by machine.  
“It’s not be such a bad idea, just to test the accuracy of the machine,” Joyce said. |
| May 2006   | Touch screen and optical scanners | Cuyahoga County, Ohio                                  | Machine malfunctions delay poll opening until 1:30 pm.  
On Cleveland's east side at Beachland polling place, supervisors who were trained to set up the machines never showed up Tuesday morning. It took about three hours for workers to figure out things for themselves and get the machines operating. At St. Dominic’s in Shaker Heights, the machines were set up but they didn’t work.  
A technician was sent over to troubleshoot. She received directions via phone, but couldn’t fix the problem.  
And scanners fail to tabulate properly.  
With all the problems reported at the polls Tuesday, NewsChannel5 has learned that the absentee results will be delayed. About 17,000 absentee votes will have to be hand counted because of a problem with optical scanners.  
David Bear, spokesman for Diebold Inc., which supplies Cuyahoga's machines, said the absentee counting problem appears to be isolated. The ovals on the ballots printed by the county did not line up properly for optical scan machines to count them, he said. |

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48 Voting machines removed from Grafton. Union Leader, March 16, 2006 by Carol Robidoux.  
Story archived at http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=6557  
49 Cleveland Polling Place Delays Statewide Election Results; Absentee Election Results To Be Delayed. Newsnet5.com. May 3, 2006.  
http://www.newsnet5.com/politics/9144311/detail.html  
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| May 2006   | AccuVote- | Cuyahoga County, Ohio. Voter access card failures, paper jams, and even a missing  | Election officials are calling for an investigation into what went wrong — holding the machine manufacturer Diebold responsible.  
                                                                 | TSX                                                                                                                                  | electrical adapter on the touch screen machines caused election problems.                                                                 | "We believe that's unacceptable and something we have to review and refine for future elections," | Elections Director Michael Vu said. |
| May 2006   | AccuVote- | Ohio. Electronic ballot boxes were lost in two counties:                           | [Cuyahoga Elections Board spokeswoman Jane] Platten said another problem was discovered later in the morning: **an unknown number of memory cards that hold vote results from touch-screen machines at 74 polling locations were missing.** The elections board was searching for the cards but Platten would not discuss any more details, citing security concerns. The county reported results from about 86 percent of its precincts by late Wednesday morning, with votes unaccounted for in about 208 precincts.  | TSX                                                                                                                                  | ... Also in northeast Ohio, Stark County reported only 97 percent of its unofficial vote totals early Wednesday because about **30 cards that record votes in electronic voting machines were missing.**  | Election officials were trying to determine if poll workers simply forgot to remove the cards. |
| May 2006   | AccuVote- | Cuyahoga County, Ohio. Screen review doesn't match ballot printout.                | A Shaker Heights voter said her vote on the schools' tax measure was confirmed on the screen but not on a printout.  
                                                                 | TSX                                                                                                                                  | And short cables cause machine placement that violates voter privacy.                                                                 | People said the touch screens were easy to read. Maybe too easy. Ken Lewis of Strongsville said he could see other voters' choices. | Poll workers said the power cords were too short to position the machines more privately. |

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51 Lack of three-pronged adaptors closes polling site for hours  WKYC.com, May 2, 2006 by Jennifer Murphy.  

Story archived at  
http://www.fortwayne.com/mld/newssentinel/14484080.htm

53 First all-electric election marred by problems The Plain Dealer, May 3, 2006 by Joan Mazzolini & Grant Segall.  
Story archived at  

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| May 2006 | Touch screen and optical scan | **Franklin County, Ohio** Early morning voters were turned away in over 160 polling places because poll workers struggled to produce start-of-the-day printouts.  
   Board of Elections Director said they haven’t seen any machine malfunctions, in spite of the problems including a switched vote between two Republican House candidates, and paper printing issues.  
   "The good news, from our perspective, is we haven't seen any machine malfunctions," [Matthew Damschroder, board of elections director] said.  
   Voters reported scattered problems with the machines, being used in today's primary election for the first time across Franklin County.  
   At Beck School on the South Side, two of five machines weren't working this morning. Damschroder said paper tapes became loose during transport so the machines incorrectly indicated they had no paper. |
| May 2006 | AccuVote OS               | **Barry County, Michigan.** Optical scanners "scramble" results. Officials have to do the count by hand.  
   Hastings city clerk Tom Emery did a double take.  
   "In the first precinct that we looked at, one candidate got zero votes, but there were 90 write-ins out of 125 votes cast," he said. "Especially since the person who got zero votes was the person that I voted for, so I knew the zero was wrong."  
   In the Thornapple school board race, the computer had both candidates with zero votes, but the write-in total was 35. The biggest problem, said Barry County clerk Debbie Smith, was for races dealing with bond proposals.  
   "All of the printouts where there were any bond proposals showed a zero total for a yes vote," she said,  
   "and it appears the actual votes cast as yes showed under the no total and the no total wasn't appearing on the tape anywhere."  
   The cause?  
   "It would all be speculation at this point," Smith said, "whether the problem was with the actual ballot printing or with the memory card programming." |

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55 [Glitch hits Barry County voting machines](http://www.woodtv.com/Global/story.asp?S=4855576&nav=0Rce)
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<td>AccuVote Touch screens</td>
<td>National. Severe security flaws revealed in Diebold touch screen systems.56</td>
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|            |                        | In the worst case scenario, the architectural weaknesses incorporated in these voting terminals allow a sophisticated attacker to develop an "offense in depth" approach in which each compromised layer will also become the guardian against clean-up efforts in the other layers. This kind of deep attack is extremely persistent and it is noteworthy that the layers can conceal the contamination very effectively should the attacker wish that. A quite natural strategy in these types of situations is to penetrate, modify and make everything look normal.  
Well documented viral attacks exist in similar systems deploying interception and falsification of hash-code calculations used to verify integrity in the higher application levels to avoid detection. The three-level attack is the worst possible attack. However, each layer can also be used to deploy a stand-alone attack. The TSx systems examined appear to offer opportunities for the three-level attack as well as the stand-alone attacks.  
**It is important to understand that these attacks are permanent in nature, surviving through the election cycles.** Therefore, the contamination can happen at any point of the device's life cycle and remain active and undetected from the point of contamination on through multiple election cycles and even software upgrade cycles. |
| June 2006  | Diebold AccuVote TS    | Leflore, Jackson Counties, Mississippi. Ballot programming by Diebold was incorrect on touch screens in these two counties.57 |
|            |                        | In Leflore and Jackson counties, early voters had to cast paper ballots because the touch-screen machines were not customized for each precinct, said David Blount, spokesman for Secretary of State Eric Clark.  
The machines were fixed by Tuesday afternoon, he said.  
The problems prompted the Leflore County election commission to petition the Board of Supervisors for their own technician.58  
Diebold Election Systems, as part of its contract, will offer assistance to the county for five years.  
But the county's difficulties during the June 6 primary were due to improper programming by a Diebold technician. These problems prompted the commission's request. |

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56 Critical Security Alert: Diebold TSx and TS6 voting systems. Published May 11, 2006. by Harri Hursti, for Black Box Voting, Inc.  
http://www.blackboxvoting.org/BBVtsxstudy.pdf


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| June 2006  | Touch screen| **Kern County, California.** Voter access cards used in a previous election failed to work in the primary.  
The Kern County Sheriff’s Department delivered 40 more memory cards via helicopter to Johnston and her husband, Ed, who were in the valley to troubleshoot any problems at the local polls. The couple then visited each polling place - Kerr McGee Center, First Baptist Church, Calvary Assembly of God, St. Michael's Episcopal Church, and Inyokern Baptist Church - to make sure each had an adequate supply of cards.  
Voters found it easy to use the machine, UNLESS software problems made it impossible.  
Workers at First Baptist Church said voters were finding the touch-screen machines easy to use.  
Wanda Reed, manager of the poll site at St. Michael's said some teachers had stopped by to vote on their way to class, and were thwarted by the software problems. |

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http://www.ridgecrestca.com/articles/2006/06/07/news/election_results/ele05.txt