

The Honorable Ricardo S. Martinez

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
AT SEATTLE

PAUL LEHTO, Individually, JOHN WELLS,  
Individually;

Plaintiffs,

vs.

SEQUOIA VOTING SYSTEMS, Inc. and  
SNOHOMISH COUNTY;

Defendants.

NO. C05-0877 RSM

**DEFENDANT SNOHOMISH  
COUNTY'S MOTION TO DISMISS  
AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT  
THEREOF**

**Noted on Motion Calendar:  
Friday, June 10, 2005**

**I. MOTION**

This motion to dismiss is brought by Defendant Snohomish County pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). Snohomish County seeks to dismiss in its entirety the lawsuit brought by Plaintiffs Paul Lehto and John Wells on the grounds that the claims alleged in their Complaint are not legally cognizable due to a lack of standing, limitations defenses, or for failure to join an indispensable party. This motion is based on the following memorandum of law, the authorities cited herein and the pleadings already on file with the Court.

## II. INTRODUCTION

1  
2 This lawsuit is brought by two Snohomish County residents who claim that  
3 Snohomish County's 2002 contract (the "Contract") with Sequoia Voting Systems, Inc.  
4 ("Sequoia") for the production and support of electronic voting machines is somehow  
5 voidable as against public policy or state and federal law. For a number of reasons made  
6 apparent on the face of the Complaint, Plaintiffs fail to present a cognizable legal claim.

7  
8 *First*, Plaintiffs' own Complaint shows that the Contract at-issue is now nearly  
9 three years old, and that Plaintiffs themselves have previously used and acquiesced as to  
10 the suitability of the voting machines they now attempt to question. Their claims are  
11 accordingly barred by applicable statutes of limitations and the equitable doctrines of  
12 laches and estoppel. *Second*, Plaintiffs clearly lack standing to challenge the Contract,  
13 either for lack of privity, or for the failure to show they meet the common law requirements  
14 to bring a suit as taxpayers challenging a government contract. *Finally*, although Plaintiffs  
15 admit it is Washington's Secretary of State that bears the responsibility for determining the  
16 suitability of any given voting system, they have failed to join the Secretary of State as an  
17 indispensable party to this suit.  
18

19 For all of these reasons, Plaintiffs' claims against Snohomish County are without  
20 legal merit and Plaintiffs' Complaint should be dismissed in its entirety.

## III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

### A. Procedural History Of The Case

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23 Plaintiffs filed this action in King County Superior Court on April 7, 2005. Compl  
24 (Docket No. 2). They served the Summons and Complaint on Defendant Snohomish  
25

1 County on April 14, 2005. Pl.'s Decl. of Service (Docket No. 5). On information and  
2 belief, Sequoia was served on approximately the same date. Id. On May 11, 2005, Sequoia  
3 removed the action to this Court. Def.'s Not. Of Removal (Docket No. 1).

4 **B. The Substance of Plaintiffs' Claims**

5 Paragraph 1.1 of Plaintiffs' Complaint broadly sets forth the substance of Plaintiffs'  
6 claims. In it, Plaintiffs state:

7 This case arises out [of] a dispute concerning a contract between defendants  
8 Snohomish County and Sequoia Voting Systems, Inc. for the purchase of  
9 Sequoia touch-screen voting computers employed in the 2004 elections  
10 (hereinafter "the Contract"). . . . Plaintiffs make claims under the Uniform  
11 Declaratory Judgments Act [RCW 7.24.010, *et seq.*] for specific declarations  
respecting the Contract and its provisions and for such further relief as may  
be necessary and proper.

12 More specifically, Mr. Lehto and Mr. Wells state:

13 Plaintiffs Wells and Lehto, as citizens and voters, object to provisions of the  
14 contract between Snohomish County and Sequoia Voting Systems, Inc.  
15 attempting to shield from public view and verification the means by which  
16 votes are recorded, counted, tabulated, and reported on the grounds that they  
17 contain "trade secret," "confidential," or "proprietary" materials. Plaintiffs  
contend, among other things, that provisions of the contract ought properly  
to be set aside based upon contractual, statutory, Constitutional and public  
policy grounds.

18 Compl. at ¶ 1.2.

19 In support of these general contentions, Plaintiffs offer 34 additional pages of  
20 averments, the bulk of which are little more than legal conclusions or political commentary.  
21 However, the following allegations establish that Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state a  
22 cognizable legal claim, and are accordingly relevant to this motion:  
23



1 In still other sections, Plaintiffs claim that “at least 81 different touch screens had to  
2 be recalibrated on election day [2004], some more than once, meaning that nearly 10% of  
3 the touch screens exhibited vote hopping or switching behavior sufficient to require  
4 intervention by elections officers or troubleshooting teams.” Id. at ¶ 5.26. Plaintiffs make  
5 no allegations that they sought to institute a timely election challenge after they became  
6 aware of these alleged improprieties in 2004. Id.

7  
8 **3. The Causes of Action All Relate To The Contract Between  
Snohomish County And Sequoia.**

9 Although Plaintiffs allege twelve separate causes of action, all twelve seek the  
10 rescission of a contract between Snohomish County and Sequoia because it is violative of  
11 some law or public policy. See generally, Id. at ¶¶ 1.1-1.2. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’  
12 Complaint is really just a taxpayer suit presenting one claim: namely, that the  
13 government’s contract is illegal (based on twelve different sources of law) and should be  
14 avoided. This commonality is apparent by examining each of Plaintiff’s claims:

- 16 • The First Claim: requests that the Court: “. . . declare the Contract void . . .  
17 [because] . . . it violates the above-described liberty interests in free and  
18 equal elections, burdens and dilutes the fair, equal and effective right to  
19 vote, and gives rise to an electoral scheme which is not rationally related to  
the purposes of establishing a representative government . . . .” Id. at ¶  
7.1.5;
- 20 • The Second Claim: requests that the Court “. . . declare the Contract void .  
21 . . . to the extent it violates the transparency of elections mandated by the  
22 Constitution, Washington law and statute, and Washington tradition.” Id. at  
¶ 7.2.4;
- 23 • The Third Claim: requests that the Court “. . . declare the Contract void . . .  
24 to the extent that it establishes an impermissible delegation of core  
25 governmental functions to a private party while purporting to relieve from  
that private party from the performance of the Constitutional, legal, and  
26 traditional obligations associated therewith.” Id. at ¶ 7.3.6;

- 1 • The Fourth Claim: requests that the Court “declare the Contract void . . . to  
2 the extent it sets forth trade secrecy and confidentiality in violation to the  
3 principles set forth under the Washington Constitution, Washington law and  
4 statute, and Washington tradition.” Id. at ¶ 7.4.5;
- 5 • The Fifth Claim: requests that the Court “declare that Sequoia breached its  
6 express and implied [contractual] warranties justifying rescission,  
7 restitution, and damages.” Id. at ¶ 7.5.5.
- 8 • The Sixth Claim: requests that the Court “declare the scheme established by  
9 the Contract to be violative of the requirements of Washington Constitution,  
10 law and state, and tradition.” Id. at ¶ 7.6.3;
- 11 • The Seventh Claim: alleges “that the contract to purchase Sequoia AVC  
12 Edge voting machines is illegal, and void *ab initio* (from the day it was  
13 signed) because it purports to waive the right to vote a legal ballot of  
14 Snohomish County electors,” and because it purportedly does not comply  
15 with statutory requirements for a “ballot.” Id. at ¶ 7.7.1;
- 16 • The Eighth Claim: requests that the Court “declare the Contract is void as the  
17 product of impermissible conflict of interest on the part of Snohomish  
18 County agents, employees and officials involved in the Contract  
19 negotiations and decisions to purchase . . . the Sequoia equipment.” Id. at ¶  
20 7.8;
- 21 • The Ninth Claim: requests that the Court award remedies because the  
22 Contract provisions call for illegal “tying” under the “Magnuson-Moss  
23 Warranty Act; Id. at ¶ 7.9.4;
- 24 • The Tenth Claim: requests that the Court “declare that the Contract is  
25 invalid and illegal in that its implementation is contrary to the statutory  
26 scheme for elections . . .” Id. at ¶ 7.10;
- The Eleventh Claim: seeks “other equitable, compensatory, or restitutionary  
relief” as provided under the Declaratory Judgment Act, but does not allege  
any new facts or causes of action separate from those already relying on the  
Contract. Id. at ¶ 7.11;
- The Twelfth Claim: requests that “the Contract be rescinded, be deemed  
void *ab initio*, and that defendant Sequoia be required to disgorge the full  
extent of any remuneration received under this illegal contract . . .” Id. at ¶  
7.12.

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**4. No Allegations That Plaintiffs Are Taxpayers.**

The Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs Mr. Lehto and Mr. Wells are both citizens of the United States, residents of Snohomish County, and registered voters therein. Id. at ¶¶ 2.1-2.2, 4.1-4.4. It further alleges both Mr. Lehto and Mr. Wells have voted “during the last two years” using Sequoia machines owned by Snohomish County. Id. at ¶¶ 4.3-4.4. There is no allegation that Mr. Lehto or Mr. Wells are Snohomish County taxpayers with standing to challenge contracts entered by Snohomish County’s elected officials. Id.

**5. Plaintiffs Do Not Allege They Presented Their Claims To The Attorney General Prior to Filing Suit.**

Finally, Plaintiffs allege that “[b]ecause constitutional claims are raised, Rob McKenna, the Washington State Attorney General, shall be and (as of the time the defendants’ answer this complaint) has been provided with a copy of this Complaint pursuant to the provisions and procedures of RCW 7.24.110.” Id. at ¶ 2.8. They do not, however, allege they provided the Attorney General with any pre-lawsuit notice of the subject matter of their claims, as is required to assert taxpayer standing to challenge government decision to contract. Id.

**6. The Secretary of State Is Not Named As a Party.**

The Complaint makes reference to the Secretary of State’s role in certifying election machines for use by County Auditor’s offices, but does not name him as a party to this suit. The Complaint states that the “Secretary of State improvidently certified the Sequoia machines in violation of 29A.12.150(2), which requires the Secretary of State not to certify unless separate ballots available for audit purposes after the election are created.” Id. at ¶ 7.7.6. It also states that “Sequoia touch screens do not comply with the

1 requirements of Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) . . . they can only be used in  
2 elections under the questionable waiver of the Washington State Secretary of State of  
3 compliance with these requirements.” Id. at ¶ 7.10.2. However, Plaintiffs do not name the  
4 Secretary of State as a party defendant in this lawsuit. Id.

#### 5 IV. ARGUMENT<sup>1</sup>

6 Plaintiffs’ rambling 35-page Complaint is replete with hyperbole and politicized  
7 commentary, but utterly devoid of alleged facts that would form the basis of a cognizable  
8 claim against Defendant Snohomish County. Nevertheless, upon sifting through Plaintiffs’  
9 narrative pleading, a few things become clear: (1) Plaintiffs’ action seeks to challenge  
10 Snohomish County’s contract with Sequoia, even though that contract was entered nearly  
11 three years and two elections ago; (2) Plaintiffs were not parties to the Contract, nor were  
12 they in privity to the parties therein; (3) Plaintiffs make no allegations that they are  
13 Snohomish County taxpayers, or that they complied with the prerequisites to bring suit as  
14 taxpayers; and (4) Plaintiffs have not named the Secretary of State as a party to this action,  
15 even though his certification is required before any machine is used in elections in this  
16 state. Such facts, established from the face of Plaintiffs’ own Complaint, show Plaintiffs  
17 cannot assert a cognizable legal claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)-(7); see also Northern  
18 Trust Co. v. Peters, 69 F.3d 123, 129 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (parties can allege themselves out of  
19 court by averring facts that defeat their legal claims).  
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24 <sup>1</sup> Snohomish County hereby joins in the Motion to Dismiss concurrently submitted by co-Defendant Sequoia  
25 Voting Systems, Inc. To the extent the arguments in the briefing submitted by Sequoia are applicable to both  
26 parties, Snohomish County requests that they be adopted herein by reference and justify dismissal of  
Plaintiffs’ claims against Snohomish County.



1 unlawful voting machines in elections run by the County. The Complaint itself pleads that  
2 the Contract between Snohomish County and Sequoia was entered into in July 2002,  
3 substantially more than two years before Plaintiffs filed this action. All of Plaintiffs'  
4 claims that arise from the County's decision to utilize the AVC Edge voting system, to  
5 contract with Sequoia to obtain that system and their claims that relate to the way that  
6 system operates as described in the contract, accrued in July 2002. This was the date the  
7 County executed the Contract and, thereby, made the official commitment of Snohomish  
8 County to henceforth utilize the AVC Edge voting system. Because Plaintiffs' claims  
9 accrued more than two years before Plaintiffs brought this action, they are barred by RCW  
10 4.16.130.  
11

12 **2. Plaintiffs' Claims Should Be Dismissed as an Improper and**  
13 **Untimely Election Contest.**

14 In their Complaint, Plaintiffs list many problems they allege occurred in the conduct  
15 of the November 2004 general election. See Compl., at ¶¶ 4.15, 4.17, 4.18, 5.23, 5.24,  
16 5.25, 5.26, 7.2.3, 7.6.1, 7.6.2, 7.6.3, 7.7.2, 7.7.4 and 7.7.5. Washington law provides a  
17 means for courts to address errors or other problems in the conduct of elections. Election  
18 contests may be brought pursuant to chapter 29A.68 RCW by any elector, upon affidavit  
19 filed with the appropriate court. RCW 29A.68.011 provides as follows:  
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21 **RCW 29A.68.011 Prevention and correction of election frauds and**  
22 **errors.** Any justice of the supreme court, judge of the court of appeals, or  
23 judge of the superior court in the proper county shall, by order, require any  
24 person charged with error, wrongful act, or neglect to forthwith correct the  
25 error, desist from the wrongful act, or perform the duty and to do as the court  
26 orders or to show cause forthwith why the error should not be corrected, the  
wrongful act desisted from, or the duty or order not performed, *whenever it  
is made to appear to such justice or judge by affidavit of an elector that:*

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(1) An error or omission has occurred or is about to occur in printing the name of any candidate on official ballots; or

(2) An error other than as provided in subsections (1) and (3) of this section has been committed or is about to be committed in printing the ballots; or

(3) The name of any person has been or is about to be wrongfully placed upon the ballots; or

(4) A wrongful act other than as provided for in subsections (1) and (3) of this section has been performed or is about to be performed by any election officer; or

(5) Any neglect of duty on the part of an election officer other than as provided for in subsections (1) and (3) of this section has occurred or is about to occur; or

(6) An error or omission has occurred or is about to occur in the issuance of a certificate of election.

An affidavit of an elector under subsections (1) and (3) above when relating to a primary election must be filed with the appropriate court no later than the second Friday following the closing of the filing period for nominations for such office and shall be heard and finally disposed of by the court not later than five days after the filing thereof. An affidavit of an elector under subsections (1) and (3) of this section when relating to a general election must be filed with the appropriate court no later than three days following the official certification of the primary election returns and shall be heard and finally disposed of by the court not later than five days after the filing thereof. *An affidavit of an elector under subsection (6) of this section shall be filed with the appropriate court no later than ten days following the issuance of a certificate of election.*

RCW 29A.68.011 (emphasis added).

If electors such as Plaintiffs wished to seek judicial intervention regarding improper actions by Snohomish County election officials in conducting the 2004 general election, they could have proceeded under this statute. However, Plaintiffs did not bring a proper election contest. The Plaintiffs did not file affidavits of electors setting forth facts related to the alleged errors as required by RCW 29A.68.011. Although Plaintiffs have been aware of the facts related to the alleged improper functioning of the touch screen voting devices since November 2, 2004, they have failed to file an election contest under chapter 29A.68

1 RCW within the 10 day statute of limitations. See RCW 29A.68.030, Reid v. Dalton, 124  
2 Wn. App. 113, 122, 100 P3d 349 (2004). Even putting aside Plaintiffs' failure to meet the  
3 statute of limitations, they have delayed unreasonably in raising their allegations and are  
4 barred by laches.

5 Plaintiffs' claims regarding the function of the touch screen voting devices during  
6 the November 2004 general election should also be barred for Plaintiffs' failure to exhaust  
7 an available remedy. RCW 29A.60 210 provides that,

8  
9 **RCW 29A.60.210 Recanvass – Generally.** Whenever the canvassing board  
10 finds that there is an apparent discrepancy or an inconsistency in the returns  
11 of a primary or election, the board may recanvass the ballots or voting  
12 devices in any precincts of the county. The canvassing board shall conduct  
13 any necessary recanvass activity on or before the last day to certify the  
14 primary or election and correct any error and document the correction of any  
15 error that it finds.

16 Plaintiffs did not bring their concerns to the attention of the County canvassing  
17 board in a timely manner to permit the canvassing board to address them prior to the  
18 certification of the election. See, Washington State Republican Party v. King County Div.  
19 of Records, 153 Wn.2d 220, 103 P.3d 725 (2004).

### 20 **3. Plaintiffs' Contract Claims Are Barred by Laches.**

21 Even if the two-year statute of limitations is somehow found inapplicable to  
22 Plaintiffs' claims arising from Snohomish County's award of the contract to Sequoia, their  
23 action is nevertheless barred by the doctrines of laches and estoppel. Laches is an implicit  
24 waiver that arises when one has knowledge of existing conditions but, through inaction,  
25 acquiesces in them. Neighbors & Friends v. Miller, 87 Wn. App. 361, 373, 940 P.2d 286  
26 (1997). Laches prevents a plaintiff from obtaining relief on an unreasonably tardy claim. A

1 claim is unreasonably tardy if (1) the plaintiff knew or had a reasonable opportunity to  
2 know the facts constituting the cause of action, (2) the plaintiff's commencement of the  
3 action was unreasonably delayed, and (3) the defendant is damaged by the delay. Id.

4 In this action, Plaintiffs seek to challenge the action of a governmental body to  
5 procure the materials needed to fulfill one of its duties to the electorate—namely, to  
6 provide for the holding of elections. Plaintiffs claim the voting systems at-issue are  
7 inherently unreliable and fail to meet statutory and Constitutional requirements for the  
8 conduct of elections. Plaintiffs therefore allege Snohomish County's contract with Sequoia  
9 to provide such machines is illegal and subject to rescission in a taxpayer suit.  
10

11 However, Plaintiffs also themselves allege that Snohomish County acquired the  
12 AVC Edge voting system in 2002 and began using it to conduct elections beginning in the  
13 fall of that year. Plaintiffs indicate in their own Complaint that they have actually voted  
14 using the system for the last two years. Compl., at ¶¶ 4.3-4.4. There is no allegation that  
15 the way the voting system works has changed since the County began using it. Thus,  
16 Plaintiffs have known or have had a reasonable opportunity to know of the facts that  
17 underlie their claims for the last two years.  
18

19 Plaintiffs' over two-year delay in bringing this action is unreasonable under the  
20 circumstances. Snohomish County has used the AVC Edge voting system in numerous  
21 elections in the past two years. Plaintiffs never challenged the use of the system before an  
22 election, at a time when the County could have taken action to address the matters of which  
23 they complain. Rather, Plaintiffs have waited to bring their claims only after an election  
24 was conducted in which their preferred candidate lost. This is unreasonable and unfair.  
25

1 If, as appears to be the case from the Complaint, Plaintiffs maintain Snohomish  
2 County should never have utilized the AVC Edge voting system, they should have taken  
3 action to enjoin the award of the contract to Sequoia in 2002, before the voting machines  
4 were bought, paid for, delivered and placed in use. This is the remedy recognized by  
5 Washington courts to challenge the allegedly improper award of public contracts, but such  
6 actions to enjoin the award of public contracts must be brought before the contract is  
7 signed. Quinn Constr. v. Fire Prot. Dist., 111 Wn. App. 19, 29, 44 P.3<sup>rd</sup> 865 (2002) (citing  
8 Dick Enterprises., Inc. v. King County, 83 Wn. App. 566, 569, 922 P.2d 184 (1996)); BBG  
9 Group, LLC v. City of Monroe, 96 Wn. App. 517, 982 P.2d 1176 (1999). Permitting  
10 Plaintiffs to bring their challenge at this late date would cause significant damage to  
11 Snohomish County in that it has already expended millions of dollars under the contract  
12 with Sequoia. The Court should hold that Plaintiffs are barred by laches from challenging  
13 the contract between Snohomish County and Sequoia.  
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15 **B. Plaintiffs Have No Standing to Challenge the Provisions of**  
16 **the Contract Between Snohomish County and Sequoia.**

17 Plaintiffs' Complaint seeks to void the Contract between Snohomish County and  
18 Sequoia, but fails to allege any recognized legal basis for such action. The Complaint fails  
19 to show Plaintiffs are parties, in privity to parties, or intended third-party beneficiaries to  
20 the Contract. Moreover, the Complaint also fails to sufficiently allege the elements of  
21 taxpayer standing in order to challenge the legality of the government's action via a  
22 taxpayer suit. For these additional reasons, Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state a claim and  
23 should be dismissed.  
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**1. Plaintiffs Fail to Show They Have Standing To Challenge The Contract As Parties, Persons in Privity to Parties, Or As Third Party Beneficiaries.**

It is well-settled law in Washington that “a stranger to a contract” has no standing to enforce that contract. Lobak Partitions, Inc. v. Atlas Constr. Co., Inc., 50 Wn. App. 493, 497, 749 P.2d 716 (1988) (“a stranger to a contract may not sue”). Likewise, it is similarly true that “one cannot cancel an agreement to which he is not a party and with which he has no privity.” Henry v. Lind, 76 Wn.2d 199, 204, 455 P.2d 927 (1969). However, Washington law does recognize that a third-party may nevertheless enforce a contract to which he is not in privity if it is made to appear that the contracting parties intended to “secure to him personally the benefits of the provisions of the contract.” Layrite Concrete Products of Kennewick, Inc. v. H. Halvorson, Inc., 68 Wn.2d 70, 72, 411 P.2d 405 (1966); see also Rowan Northwest Decorators, Inc. v. Washington State Convention & Trade Center, 78 Wn. App. 322, 332-333, 898 P.2d 310 (1995) (non-party to contract could not complain the contract’s conflict of interest provisions would be violated if performance was allowed to proceed between parties). “In order to create [such] a third-party beneficiary contract, the parties must intend to create one.” Donald B. Murphy Contractors, Inc. v. King Co., 112 Wn. App. 192, 196, 49 P.3d 912 (2002) (citing Postlewait Construction, Inc. v. Great American Ins. Co., 106 Wn.2d 96, 99, 720 P.2d 805 (1986)). “The test of intent is an objective one: whether performance under the contract would necessarily and directly benefit the third party.” Id. “Merely incidental, indirect or inconsequential benefits to a third party are insufficient to demonstrate an intent to create a third-party beneficiary

1 contract.” Id. (citing Del Guzzi Construction Co., Inc. v. Global Northwest Ltd., Inc., 105  
2 Wn.2d 878, 885, 719 P.2d 120 (1986)).

3 Here, there is no question the only parties to the Contract were Defendants  
4 Snohomish County and Sequoia. Compl. at ¶ 3.9, 5.4, Ex. 1. Likewise, Plaintiffs allege no  
5 facts from which it could be inferred they are in privity to either party. See generally, Id. at  
6 ¶¶ .2.1-2.2, 4.1-4.4. Finally, there are no allegations in the Complaint that the contract to  
7 procure voting machines in order to conduct elections in Snohomish County was made with  
8 the intent to specifically benefit Mr. Wells and Mr. Lehto. Id. at ¶¶ 3.9, 5.4, Ex. 1.  
9 Plaintiffs thus fail to show any basis to infer their status as third-party beneficiaries to the  
10 Contract. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to assert any standing to assert defenses  
11 to the validity of the Contract at-issue and Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed.  
12

13 **2. Plaintiffs Fail To Allege Facts Establishing Taxpayer Standing.**

14 Lacking standing to directly challenge the Contract as a party, persons in privity to  
15 parties, or as third-party beneficiaries to the contract, the only other recognized legal basis  
16 for Plaintiffs to challenge the award of a contract by Snohomish County is a “taxpayer  
17 suit.” However, Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts sufficient to state such cause of action.  
18

19 Washington courts have recognized that taxpayer suits are available to challenge the  
20 award of a public contract that “will illegally cast upon taxpayers a substantially larger  
21 burden of expense than is necessary”. Times Publishing Co. v. Everett, 9 Wash. 518, 522,  
22 37 Pac. 695 (1894). In a proper case, the courts will enjoin the award of such a contract.  
23 Bellingham American Pub. Co. v. Bellingham Pub. Co., 145 Wash. 25, 258 Pac. 836  
24 (1927); Mottner v. Town of Mercer Island, 75 Wn. 2d 575, 579, 454 P.2d 750 (1969).  
25

1 Courts have entertained taxpayer lawsuits, for instance, where a government contract is  
2 found to be unlawful because it is in conflict with a specific statute or ordinance. See  
3 Mincks v. City of Everett, 4 Wn. App. 68, 480 P.2d 230 (1971).

4 However, courts have created a common law prerequisite to bringing such a suit so  
5 that they may balance the public's need to police the acts of its elected officials with the  
6 government's need to act without constant citizen interference in the performance of its day  
7 to day operations. See Reiter v. Wallgren, 28 Wn.2d 872, 874, 184 P.2d 571 (1947) (noting  
8 courts should avoid "having the regularity and legality of every contract and every act of  
9 state officers and committees subject to challenge by any litigious spirit whose personal  
10 views are at variance with the action taken," as well as allowing citizens to act against "the  
11 failure of public officers to protect the public interest"). The two conditions precedent to  
12 bringing a taxpayer suit to enjoin a public contract are: (1) that Plaintiffs allege they are  
13 taxpayers who are burdened by the expense of the contract (in other words, that they pay  
14 the type of taxes that fund the project in question); and (2) that, before bringing suit,  
15 Plaintiffs demand that the state Attorney General take action to prevent the improper  
16 expenditure of tax funds. Tabor v. Moore, 81 Wn.2d 613, 617, 503 P.2d 736 (1972). For  
17 instance, in Dick Enterprises, Inc. v. King County, 83 Wn. App. 566, 572, 922 P.2d 184  
18 (1996), the court found a disappointed bidder to a government contract could not challenge  
19 the validity of the contract that was awarded because it failed to plead these prerequisites:  
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22 The Regional Justice Center is funded from county property taxes, but  
23 neither [the Plaintiff] nor either of its partners owns property in the county.  
24 Finally, [Plaintiff] did not show that it requested action by the Attorney  
25 General's office.

1 In the instant case, just as in Dick Enterprises, Plaintiffs have not properly pled a  
2 taxpayer suit. Plaintiffs' Complaint is clearly couched as a taxpayer lawsuit, as it seeks to  
3 have a contractual agreement undertaken by a public body voided because it is allegedly  
4 unlawful or unconstitutional. See Section III.B.3, *infra*. However, Plaintiffs' Complaint  
5 wholly fails to plead the prerequisites necessary to show taxpayer standing. Although  
6 Plaintiffs claim they are Snohomish County "voters," they do not allege they are  
7 Snohomish County taxpayers. See Section III.B.4, *infra*. Likewise, they mention the fact  
8 that they will provide the Attorney General with a copy of the Complaint "as of the time of  
9 defendants' answer," but do not otherwise allege they have presented their issues to the  
10 Attorney General for action prior to initiating this suit. See Section III.B.5, *infra*.  
11 Plaintiffs thus fail to show they met their necessary duty to present their claims "to the  
12 public officials who are charged with responsibility" for preventing unlawful public  
13 expenditures. Reiter, 28 Wn.2d at 877. Absent such presentation and a showing that the  
14 officials failed to act, Plaintiffs cannot bring suit. Dick Enterprises, 83 Wn. App. 573.  
15 Such a mechanism is not merely technical, it is fundamental in balancing the competing  
16 interests of citizens in overseeing the acts of their government and the government in  
17 operating efficiently and without undue impediments. See Reiter, 28 Wn.2d at 877. Since  
18 Plaintiffs wholly fail to allege these conditions precedent to maintaining a taxpayer action,  
19 their Complaint must be dismissed.  
20  
21

22 **C. Plaintiffs' Claims Should Be Dismissed Because They Have**  
23 **Failed to Join an Indispensable Party**

24 As Plaintiffs admit in their Complaint, the AVC Edge voting system produced by  
25 Defendant Sequoia was approved and certified by the Washington Secretary of State for  
26

1 use by counties in conducting elections. Compl. at ¶¶ 7.7.6. RCW Chapter 29A.12 details  
2 the procedures and requirements for certification of a voting system for use in conducting  
3 elections in Washington. Defendant Snohomish County acquired and utilized the AVC  
4 Edge voting system because it was authorized to do so by RCW 29A.12.010 (formerly  
5 RCW 29.33.020). The approval process referred to is set forth in RCW 29A.12.020 as  
6 follows:

7 **RCW 29A.12.020 Inspection and test by secretary of state -- Report.** The  
8 secretary of state shall inspect, evaluate, and publicly test all voting systems  
9 or components of voting systems that are submitted for review under RCW  
10 29A.12.030. The secretary of state shall determine whether the voting  
11 systems conform with all of the requirements of this title, the applicable  
12 rules adopted in accordance with this title, and with generally accepted  
13 safety requirements. The secretary of state shall transmit a copy of the report  
14 of any examination under this section, within thirty days after completing the  
15 examination, to the county auditor of each county.

16 Several of the causes of action alleged by Plaintiffs directly relate to the approval of  
17 the AVC Edge voting system by the Secretary of State as they are concerned with the way  
18 the system functions as approved by the Secretary of State. These include:

- 19 • First Cause of Action - “Impermissible infringement on Liberty Interests in Free  
20 and Equal Elections.” Compl. at ¶ 7.1;
- 21 • Second Cause of Action – “Violation of Open Election Requirements.” Id. at ¶ 7.2;
- 22 • Third Cause of Action – “Impermissible Delegation of Core Governmental  
23 Function.” Id. at ¶ 7.3;
- 24 • Sixth Cause of Action – “Failure to Provide Required Chain of Custody of Ballots.”  
25 Id. at ¶ 7.6;
- 26 • Seventh Cause of Action – “Failure to Provide Separate Secret Ballot.” Id. at ¶ 7.7;
- Tenth Cause of Action – “Failure to Meet Federal and State Standards for Voting  
Systems.” Id. at ¶ 7.10;

1 Plaintiffs directly challenge the approval of the AVC Edge voting system for use in  
2 Washington elections and seek declaratory and injunctive relief overturning the approval  
3 and certification of the AVC Edge voting system and enjoining its future use.

4 Notwithstanding the nature of Plaintiffs' claims and the relief they seek, Plaintiffs  
5 have failed to join the Washington Secretary of State as a party to this action. Under Fed.  
6 R. Civ. P. 19(a), the Court should determine that the Secretary of State is a necessary party  
7 and indispensable to this action. The joinder of the Secretary of State is required because  
8 in his absence, complete relief could not be accorded among the existing parties in that the  
9 continued certification and use of the AVC Edge voting system in this state could not be  
10 enjoined. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1). Moreover, the Secretary of State has an interest, as  
11 chief elections officer of the state (RCW 29A.040.230), in making sure that voting systems  
12 are used uniformly throughout all the counties in the state. His ability to protect that  
13 interest would be impaired if this action were disposed of in his absence. Fed. R. Civ. P.  
14 19(a)(2)(ii).

15  
16  
17 Because Plaintiffs have failed to join the Secretary of State, this action should be  
18 dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7).

## 19 V. CONCLUSION

20 Plaintiffs' Complaint not only fails to state a cognizable legal claim, it establishes  
21 clear legal defenses that would defeat any claims that might otherwise be raised. Plaintiffs'  
22 attempt to challenge the decisions of Snohomish County's elected officials is substantively  
23 untimely. The allegations in the Complaint fail to state a sustainable cause of action under  
24

1 well-established Washington law. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed in  
2 their entirety.

3 Respectfully submitted this 18th day of May, 2005

4 JANICE E. ELLIS  
5 Snohomish County Prosecuting Attorney

6 /s/ Douglas J. Morrill

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