Because S.1487 and HR. 811 are both election reform bills under consideration by this Congress, it is instructive to compare both bills, and note what is different between them. The devil is in the details, or in this case, the differences:

While neither bill assures our right to “one person, one vote”, votes are less safe, and less likely to be counted, in S.1487:

	S.1487 correctly replaces references to “paper ballot” with “paper record”, a stinging reminder that the two are not equal.
	S.1487 removes the test of “clear and convincing evidence” with regards to tampering, making the paper records easier to ignore.
	S.1487 allows the paper records of an entire precinct to be ignored, if there is any hint of “mischief”, while H.R.811 suggests that tampering be considered on a machine-by-machine basis
	S.1487 omits language in H.R.811 that would require prominent reminders for voters to double-check their paper records before casting the vote.
	S.1487 adds dangerous, racist “residual benchmarks”, and deletes the accuracy standard originally established by HAVA.
	S.1487 alters disclosure requirements, to offer improved protection for corporate “trade secrets” and anything else the corporations consider confidential information, at the expense of vote integrity.
	S.1487 permits machines used in vote tabulation to be connected to the internet, creating an obvious vulnerability.
	S.1487 omits language in H.R.811 that would require polling stations to offer real, paper ballots, as an alternative to electronic voting. (Update: the committee that marked up H.R.811 also appears to have stealth-deleted this requirement from H.R.811, a violation of normal procedure, as the deletion occurred after committee markup sessions had concluded.)

While H.R.811 expands the role of the Commission to an unconstitutional degree, S.1487 goes hog-wild:

	H.R.811 relies on the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology to develop best practices, but S.1487 hands that responsibility over to the Commission.
	H.R.811 would like States to play some role in the voting system certification process. S.1487 hands control to the Commission, even permitting the Commission to break its own rules on a whim, under the guise of “emergency certification.”
	H.R.811 requires limited disclosure between manufacturers, labs and state election officials, but S.1487 makes the Commission the central command.
	H.R.811 mandates that the Commission shall select labs at random “to the greatest extent practicable”, but S.1487’s language is weaker.
	H.R.811 requires the Commission to inform the public if it has “credible evidence of significant security failure at an accredited laboratory”, but S.1487 omits this, preferring such knowledge remain a secret between the lab and the Commission.
	H.R.811 allows the Director of the National Science Foundation to determine who is eligible to receive grants for research, but S.1487 gives this responsibility to the Commission too.

While H.R.811 offered an insufficient audit regime, S.1487 audits are meaningless:

	H.R.811 requires that States may not give any advance notice as to which precincts will be selected for audit. S.1487 omits this line.
	H.R.811 allows audits to be skipped if the winning candidate received 80% or more of the total votes, S.1487 does not.
	H.R.811 requires the entity conducting the audit to “meet the standards established by the Comptroller General to ensure the independence” of all parties, and requires that audits be performed “under generally accepted government accounting standards.” S.1487 omits all of this.
	H.R.811 attempts to outline several additional requirements for the audit, including that at least 10% of all precincts be audited in the case of a particularly close race. S.1487 suggests 2%.
	H.R.811 provides States the opportunity to develop their own audit standards, so long as the National Institute of Standards and Technology verifies the proposed method is at least as accurate as the method that H.R.811 outlines. S.1487 omits this; why consult NIST or permit States’ rights when one can simply defer all judgment to the Commission?
	H.R.811 requires audits to be random, but also insists that at least one precinct from each county be audited. S.1487 omits this safeguard.
	H.R.811 insists that the Commission adopt model audit procedures before the next Presidential election. S.1487 is content to wait until 2010.
	H.R.811 appropriates $100,000,000 to assist states in paying the cost of a rigorous audit regime. S.1487 tells States to go lay an egg.

Other curious differences:

	S.1487 omits several of HR. 811’s legal protections for “aggrieved persons”, who have been disenfranchised, to seek remedy.
	S.1487 cuts the total research spending by $2,000,000.
	S.1487 cuts the total grants for purchase of equipment by $400,000,000.
	S.1487 bases funding allocation on the number of precincts, while H.R.811 bases it on voting age population.
	S.1487 expands and clarifies the protection of voters who speak certain languages other than English, as described in the 1965 Voting Rights Act.
	S.1487 is lax with deadlines, setting most of them back, until after the next Presidential election.
	S.1487 declares the EAC exempt from the Paperwork Reduction Act.

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people.
~ Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution